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GROWTH OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS OVER NEUTRAL
TRADE.
The process of international stock-taking which follows
war reveals a growth of international law. Out of the welter
of violations, alleged violations, denials, interpretations and
new practices, international law emerges with certain definite
modifications, due to the adaptation of the rules to new
circumstances and changed conditions, which have come into
being since the last war. This growth does not necessarily
include all the extensions proposed and practiced by belliger-
ents (luring the course of the war, although many of those
extensions may form the basis for the law in its expanded
form. A belligerent cannot alter international law in his
own favor during the course of a war, but if he could not
interpret the old law to suit the new conditions, the law
would be self-destructive by simply having no relation to the
world it is intended to rule. Such of these interpretations
as are not valid, according to the findings of subsequent
international practice, are called in this connection "exten-
sions" of the law, and such interpretations as are due not
solely to the wish of a single belligerent but are dictated
by universal economic and geographic facts and consequently
may become valid rules, are, for the purposes of this dis-
cussion, called "growths." To put the matter succinctly,
the growth is what is left when all of the "extensions" have
been tried in the balance of international practice.
That department of the law which relates to the con-
flicting interests of neutrals and belligerents has peculiar
interest to the United States, both on account of the tra-
ditional foreign policy of that nation, and on account of
that nation's share in the formation of this law. The right
of a belligerent to restrain neutral commerce from carrying
aid to his enemy, was asserted by both groups of belligerents
in the "orld War. The extensions of practice laid down and
followed by Germany in this field we will pass by, because
(20)
GROWTII OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS
in that final court of appeal to which she committed her
case, Germany lost the decision. But Great Britain made
novel assertions, which we cannot so lightly dismiss. Not
merely because Great Britain was on the victorious side,
but also because all those powers associated with the Entente
Allies, including finally the United States, participated with
Great Britain in the benefits of those new interpretations of
the rules. The purpose of our inquiry is to discover as far
as possible whether the interpretations made by Great Britain
are to be considered in the nature merely of extensions, or
whether, when all the smoke is cleared away, they may not
find place in the expanded Law of Nations.
It is, of course, an inquiry which involves the ancient
discussion of the legal nature of international law. Is it
law? At what point does a new practice become law? What
is it without sanction? Such are the pitfalls into which the
incautious investigator is apt to stumble when bent on a
practical, rather than on a philosophical inquiry. Though
anxious to avoid this set of problems, it is necessary, never-
theless, to understand one point in the philosophical aspect
of the subject. That point need not be settled, but it should
be understood. That is the interesting fact that in the law
of neutral and belligerent rights, the offense consists in getting
caught. The matteiis put thus crudely, not merely for
the sake of clearness, but also because it expresses the actual
state of the law on this subject. A neutral merchant has
a right in international law, to send goods to a belligerent.
If he send arms and munitions he does not involve his country
in any act of unneutrality; the shipment is legal and the
trade is lawful., But if he gets caught, he is penalized by
the loss of his goods. A belligerent has a right to prevent
certain goods from reachinghis enemy for his military use;
and those are the very goods which the neutral has a legal
right to ship. It is here that a confusion of terms arises.
The trade in contraband articles has been termed "illegal,"
1 See Sec. Lansing to Ambassador Penfield, Aug. 12, 1915, for a good sum-
mary of the law on this subject. In International Conciliation Pamphlets
No. 96.
22 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"illicit" and "unlawful" by certain jurists, who did not
thereby mean to imply that the trade was forbidden in
international law. Judge Story used the expression "illicit or
contraband trade"' and Chief Justice Chase remarked "the
conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband articles
is always unlawful, etc."3 It is an unfortunate inadequacy
of legal terminology which produces confusion of words here,
but that is no reason why there should be any confusion of
thought. Kent has put the law correctly, "A trade by
a neutral in articles contraband of war is a lawful trade,
though a trade, from necessity, subject to inconvenience
and. loss."' Dr. Lushington tried to rationalize the matter
by talking about "limited illegality,"' but Phillimore does
better in his statement, "The carrier of contraband may
violate the proclamation of the neutral state of which he
is a member, and deprive himself of the right to protection
from her, but the punishment of his offense is,. by the general
law of nations, left to the belligerent who has the right of
capture."' The belligerent must be his own policeman, for
a neutral is under no obligations to stop its nationals from
shipping contraband. Yet after forcing the belligerent into
this position and making him his own policeman, the neutral
then complains at the policeman's methods, and here comes
in the whole controversy which is our subject. It has been
suggested that the extreme belligerent view assumes "the
right of a belligerent to prevent certain goods from reaching
the country of his enemy for his military use"7 while the
extreme neutral view assumes "the right of a neutral to
continue his commerce with both belligerents." The forces
of the two views are bound occasionally to conflict, and the
resultant of these forces is the law on the subject. Our
task is to discover whether the traditional neutral or the
2 Carrington v. Insurance Co., 8 Peters, 495 (1834). (In the "Santissima
Trinidad." 7 Wheat. 283 (1822) Story states the law correctly.)
S"Peterhoff," ? Wallace 28 (1866).
Seton v. Low, i Johnson (N. Y.) 1, (1799)-
'The "Helen," L. R. i Adm. & Ecc. 1, (1865).
'The "International," 3 Adm. & cc. 321 (1871).
7 E. C. Stowell, 1o2 N. Y. "Nation" S14.
GROIVTII OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS
traditional belligerent viewpoint has emerged from the world
war with the greater confirmation and recognition. In other
words has the law expanded in favor of the neutral or of
the belligerent? For purposes of convenience we will treat
the subject separately under the headings of contraband,
blockade and continuous voyage. These are more or less
arbitrary divisions of the law, which originally had distinct
and definite provinces. Whether they are still distinct and
separate remains to be seen, but at any rate they afford
useful compartments into which to arrange our facts and
our thoughts.
I. THE LAW OF CONTRABAND OF VAR.
Grotius' classic tripartite division has always in the
past guided the practice of the law of contraband. Absolute
contraband consisted of aiticles which were absolutely for
military use, and might be captured anywhere by a bellig-
erent, if they were en route to his enemy on the sea, or by
way of belligerent territory. Conditional contraband con-
sisted of those articles which could be treated as contraband
only on the condition that they were bound for the armed
forces of the enemy, and not to his civil population. Non-
contraband is self-descriptive. As late as the London naval
conference of I909:serious and sincere efforts were being
made to classify articles of commerce specifically and by
name into one or another of these three divisions. But
during the world war something happened and the distinc-
tions disappeared. It was not so much what some sea-power
dictated, but what economic fact dictated, that caused this
change. What, after all, was the ultimate significance of
those familiar catch-word expressions, "a nation in arms,"
"the mobilization of industry," "the pooling of national
resources," "feed the guns," and a dozen others which formed
the titles for newspaper and magazine articles in the years
of war? How frequently is it realized how completely these
expressions sever the old order from the new? How is it
possible to discuss the distinction between food destined to
24 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
a civil population and food destined to military forces, when
no such distinction in fact exists. What is the value of the
old distinction between articles which can and articles which
cannot be adapted to military use, when by the mobilization
of industries and resources, every agency within a nation
becomes a cog in the military machine? A French writer
has it: "We must ask the reader to take us quite literally,
when we state that the whole of the living forces of the
country are absorbed in war" -and "the expression 'a nation
in arms,' is no longer an extravagant figure of speech, it
is nothing but the strict truth," and "the state by assuming
control of their (industries) productive effort, which con-
ditions the operation of armies, makes them, so to speak,
an expansion of military activities."$ In the light of these
expressions what becomes of the old Grotian classification?
As between absolute and conditional cc5ntrabaid, the
world is confronted with a new- situation. At the outbreak
of the world war, the question of what, specifically, was
conditional and what, specifically, was absolute contraband
had after centuries of disagreement, in which every nation
had been a law unto itself, been codified in the so-called
Declaration of London of 19o9. But while the specific des-
ignation of certain articles into certain classes was a useful
guide, it was not, at the outbreak of the war, international
law. For it had not as yet been ratified by all the powers,
and Great Britain, perhaps the most important of all the
powers in such a question, had failed to ratify the code.
Hence the United States Department of State truly said,
after its vain efforts to get all the belligerents to adhere to
the Declaration of London, that the great neutral would
"insist that the rights and duties of the United States and
its citizens, in the present war be defined by the existing
rules of international law and the treaties of the United
Stateg, irrespective of -the Declaration of London."' This
meant in effect that each- nation would lay down its own
I Georges Blanthon: "The New Warfare," (Eug. Tr.) p. 43 ff.
U. S. Secretary of State to U. S. Ambassador in London, Oct. 22, 1914,
reprinted in International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 95, p. 6.
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lists of contraband, subject to the vague general limitations
of Grotius' definition. Under this practice each belligerent
published its contraband list. Then Great Britain began
that series of practices which hurt neutrals. By successive
Orders in Council, she steadily increased her lists of absolute
contraband and at the same time diminished the lists of
conditional contraband. By taking articles from the con-
ditional list and adding them to the absolute list she was
illustrating the reaction of the law of war to modern economic
conditions. Belligbrents were told "food will win the war,"
why not then regard food as absolute contraband as much
as gunpowder? Motor trucks could not move without lubri-
cating oil and gasoline, and without motor trucks Germany's
spectacular advances would have been impossible. Why,
then, are not petroleum products in the same class with
machine guns? The facts of the economic organization of
the world were such that Germany very early instituted a
" food administration." As soon as that was done the last
vestige of distinction between food destined for civil popu-
lation and food destined for the military forces disappeared,
and this public administration of food was "one of the reasons
actuating His Majesty's Government in deciding to bring
the cargo of the 'Wilhelmina' before a prize court."10 The
"Wilhelmina" was a ship carrying food (conditional con-
traband) to Hamburg.
But such practice could not stop here. Was it the
British Government or the logic of economic development
which finally announced "the circumstances of the present
war are so peculiar that His Majesty's Government con-
siders that for practical purposes the distinction between the
two classes of contraband (absolute and conditional) has
ceased to have any value. So large a proportion of the
inhabitants of the enemy country are taking part, directly
or indirectly, in the war, that no real distinction can now be
drawn between the armed forces and the civil population.
2n Sir Edward Grey to the U. S. Ambassador, Feb. 19, 1915, reprinted in
International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 95, p. 67.
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Since the enemy government has taken control by a series of
decrees and orders of practically all the articles on this list
of conditional contraband, they are now available for govern-
ment use. So long as these exceptional conditions continue,
our belligerent rights with respect to the two classes of con-
traband are the same, and our treatment of them must be
identical.""1 But are these "exceptional conditions" ever
going to cease to "continue"? With a greater degree of
governmental control everywhere, and with more and more
governmental ownership, does not the distinction between
governmental and private enterprise become more and more
indistinct? Moreover we have but to look at the kind of
articles which under the new circumstances are useful for
military purposes, to see that they include practically every-
thing which under the old system was conditional contra-
band, yet which in modern war, with the governmental
administration of so many agencies, become almost ipso
facto, absolute contraband. Observe the operation of the
notorious "Rathenau Plan" under which Germany plun-
dered conquered territory. Under this system Germany
requisitioned "individual and firm name plates, in and on
houses, door knobs and knockers, the metal decorations on
doors and carriages, etc.," and "velvets, plush and silk
textiles" and "curtain rods, stein covers, stair rods, clothes
hangers and gas fixtures."12 "Thoroughness" and "effi-
ciency" were the order of the day in these seizures, and it
may be said quite literally that the German officials seized
every imaginable variety of aricle capable of either peaceful
or military use, and used those articles for the support of
the German war machine. Not only articles adaptable to
both uses, but articles which in their component parts,
constituents or derivatives might be useful to the war ma-
" Preface to list of Contraband Articles presented by the British Foreign
Office to both Houses of Parliament, April 13, 1915, reprinted in Amer. Journal
of International Law, X. spec. number (1916).
" For discussion of the details of the Rathenau Plan see "German Treat-
ment of Conquered Territory.," No. 8 of series published by U. S. Committee
on Public Information. Official texts will be found in "German Legislation
for the Occupied Territories of Belgium," ed. by Huberich and Nicol-Speyer
MHague, 1915-17).
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chine were requisitioned. The economics of modern war
seems to have obliterated both the difference and the dis-
tinction between goods susceptible to war-like purposes and
goods susceptible to both war and peace purposes. The
reason for that is plain on an examination of the list of so-
called conditional contraband articles under the Declaration
of London."3 Scrutiny of the list will disclose the fact that
every one of the articles for which it was supposed a special
rule might be made,.is of such a character as to be not merely
possibly useful in war, but absolutely indispensable in modem
warfare. That list made up with such effort in i909 con-
tains articles of such nature that every item is necessary to
a warring nation's army, and so necessary that it would be
folly to think of winning the war without it. The Declara-
tion of London would have presumed that submarines, fuel
and lubricants, aeroplanes, telegraph and wireless instru-
ments going to Germany in the World War might have had
an innocent destinationl
But even with all this, there at least remained the dis-
tinction between contraband and non-contraband, and so
long as other questions were not involved it might have been
presumed that non-contraband was free from molestation.
But here the same economic facts come into play. The
expression "mobilization of resources" involves a recognition
of the interdependence" of industries, the subordination and
adaptation of all industries to the war machine, the questions
of "essential" and "non-essential" industries, priority lists
and numerous other processes which indicate how all articles
of commerce may become in one way or another related to
and subject to the demands of the war machine. In sup-
port of this sweeping statement it is interesting to note the
terms of the President's proclamation of February 16, 1918,
in extending the executive control of exports and listing
certain articles which might not be exported without license.
Presumably commerce in these articles was of importance to
the war machine. In listing them we find such expressions
u Arts. 24, 34, 3S of Declaration of London.
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as certain articles and "machines for their manufacture or
repair, component parts thereof, materials or ingredients
used in their manufacture, and all articles convenient or
necessary for their use," and this, "animals of every kind,
their products or derivatives," and this "all non-edible animal
or vegetable products" and this "all metals, minerals, mineral
oils, ore and all derivatives and manufactures thereof."" 4
If further interesting and eloquent facts be required on this
subject one might turn to the list of articles supplied to the
various branches of the army by the Supply Service of the
Quartermaster Corps. While designed for quite a different
purpose it reveals what an interesting variety of articles,
which at first glance one might say were of no practical
military use, are in fact supplied for military purposes.
"School-books, cork-screws, cuspidors, pencil-sharpeners, rat-
traps, whistles, clothes-pins, assorted hair, lamp and window
shades" will all be found listed.", One English writer in-
forms us that "a short time ago one of the neutral powers
attempted to make a list of contraband and submitted the
question to its military experts and scientists. After de-
voting considerable study to the subject, they reported that
"with the exception of human hair, there was not a single
element or substance which could not in some way be made
to serve a military purpose." 16 After all, is it not a fair
question to ask whether these modifications and interpre-
tations which Great Britain has made may not soon be
recognized as the logical outcome of a present day social
and economic condition which is not going to change back
again just because the war is ended?
II. THE LAw OF BLOcKADE.
Said the German Chancellor (Bethmann-Hollweg) to
the Reichstag, " . . Great Britain and her allies have
ridden roughshod over all neutral rights of trade and inter-
course with the central European states. . . . England
11 See War Trade Board Journal, Mar. 19t8, pp.4-i-
16 See Manual of the Quartermaster Corps of thUS. Army, par. 227.
16 A. M. Low: "The Law of Blockade" (1916) p. A8.
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went so far as to forbid such humane acts on the part of
American philanthropists as the sending of milk to German
children! The last Order in Council threatens trade with
new unlawful aggravations of the blockade rules, against
the previous violations of which the American Government
has already protested."' 7 By way of eliminating the ex-
traneous matter of the milk and proceeding right into the
law of blockade itself, let us notice the remark "England
can no more permit milk to go to Germany than she can
permit food stuffs ,or cotton or explosives; because, among
other reasons, milk can be converted into explosives, and the
tin cans in which condensed milk is packed make excellent
trench bombs."e After all Germany boasted too many times
about her chemists and she could not complain if at last
she was taken seriously. Moreover, some of the "potato-
masher" hand grenades used by the German troops cer-
tainly looked as if they had been made out of old empty
tin cans. But this is aside from the law of blockade. The
Chancellor branded the British blockade as illegal. There
has been much discussion on the point of what constitutes
a legal blockade, largely because the British and Continental
lawyers have been at variance on the method of enforce-
ment. But essential points are common to both schools:
a blockade is the shutting off of a part or all of an enemy's
coast line and forbidding all ingress thereto or egress there-
from by sea; 19 a blockade is a wholly maritime affair; ° to
be binding it must be effective;" the blockading government
should give formal notice of blockade through the regular
diplomatic channels,22 after which neutrals are on notice
and may not attempt breach of blockade without risking
Speech of Apr. 5, gx6, reprinted in International Conciliation Pam-
phlets, No. io4, p. 6, supplied by German Embassy.
"9 A. M. Low: "The Law of Blockade" (1916) p. 18.
19 See, for instance, Lawrence, International Law, 5th ed., par. 246.
20 The "Peterhoff," 5 Wallace 28 (i86i).
Art. 4 of Declaration of Paris, reprinted in G. B. Davis: "Elements
of International Law," Appendix C.
" Recognized by Declaration of London, Arts. 8-13, upon which, however,
the doctrine does not depend for its legality, because the Declaration did not
become law.
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the loss of both cargo and ship.23 Such were the rules under
which Great Britain might have shut off her enemy. But at
the outset she did not avail herself of this privilege. Instead
she changed the contraband lists until there was nothing
left in the conditional contraband class, and the case might
have rested there and been fought out without any question
of technical blockade ever having been raised. But the
employment of the "war-zones" resulted in more and more
rigid practices on both sides until Germany had announced
the policy which finally led the United States into the war,
and Great Britain had adopted a policy which forbade any
vessels from coming in or going out of German ports. The
competition of German decrees and British Orders in Council
is somewhat analogous to the Decrees of Napoleon and the
Orders in Council of Pitt and others during the Napoleonic
wars, and having in mind the fact that most of that compe-
tition of Napoleon's day was simply a case of England and
France striking wildly at one another in utter disregard of
the most elementary neutral rights which were clear "ex-
tensions" and never became "expansions" of international
law, we can examine the practices of the world war the more
dispassionately. The Order in Council of March Ii, i915,
was not called a "blockade" but was denominated "steps
for restricting further the commerce of Germany."24 In a
sense the German Chancellor was justified in assuming that
this was to all intents and purposes a blockade, because its
terms forbade further commerce with the German ports.
Unofficially the British officials spoke of the process as a
blockade, and to the newspapers and general public it was
always a blockade. But as the Prime minister explained to
the House of Commons, "In dealing with opponents who
have openly repudiated all the restraints both of law and
of humanity, we are not going to allow our efforts to be
strangled in a network of judicial niceties" for "there is
no form of economic pressure to which we do not consider
ourselves entitled to resort."25
The "Adula" 176 U. S. 361 (1899).
-' Reprinted in International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 95, p. 45.
'u 70 Hansard 6oo, Mar. Ii, 1913.
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"Economic pressure" is the key-word of the problem.
That is a belligerent right insofar as it can be applied without
violating the sovereign rights of neutrals and the ordinarily
accepted standards of humanity in dealing with an enemy,
which last, in its internationally legal sense, has never been
meant to forbid the starving of civilian populations as a,
method of pressure. This may seem harsh, and in fact may
be wickedly immoral, but it is the accepted practice and
hence the law. But in applying this new form of economic
pressure, it was really immaterial whether Great Britain
used the word "blockade" or not, because inasmuch as all /07
German commerce had long since been almost extinguished
at sea, the real question was with regard to shipments via
neutral states. But an examination of the Order in Council
will disclose the fact that far from "extending" the rules of
blockade Great Britain was not even taking full advantage
of them, for she was not confiscating vessels, but only car-
goes. What had actually happened was that Great Britain
was employing the so-called "Doctrine of continuous voy-
age." As the Minister for Foreign Affairs explained to the
Commons, "We are applyihg the doctrine of continuous
voyage, and it is being applihd now. On what other grounds _ / 2
are the goods to neutral ports being held up but on the'grounds
of continuous voyage? If you had established the old teclb-
nical blockade you would no doubt have been entitled to
confiscate more largely ships and goods than at the present
time. While you stop now and detain them, and do not let
the goods go through, you do not confiscate as largely as
you would if you had the old technical blockade . ..
What we want to do is to prevent goods from reaching oF
coming from the enemy country and that is what we are 3, a
doing."24 No one would doubt the right of a belligerent
not merely to prevent an importation of supplies, but to
prevent export as well as import, and to cut off all communi-
cation of commerce with the blockaded place,"27 but if a' 3rl
"' Speech of Jan. 26, 199, reprinted in International Conciliation Pam-
phlets, No. Xo0, p. 33.
7 Sir William Scott in the "Frederick Moltke," i C. Rob. 86 (1798).
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belligerent chooses to exercise that right without asserting
her belligerent's rights to the full, certainly she cannot be
accused of "extending" the rules at all. The real object
of our search does not lie in the field of the law of blockade
at all, but, as Sir Edward Grey pointed out, in the field of
the law of "continuous voyages."2
I. TIlE LAW AND THtE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS
VOYAGES.
Suspending for a moment our discussion of the growth
of the laws of contraband and blockade, we must review
another and, in its origin, totally distinct, doctrine. That
this is one of the most intellectually picturesque phases of
international law is evidenced by the voluminous studies on
the subject. Avoiding a comprehensive and exhaustive
analysis which might lead us astray from the main line of
developmcnt to its latest stage, we will begin with an inci-
dent which preceded even Grotius. In l604, during a war
between Spain and Holland, two Venetian vessels (neutrals)
were engaging under license from Spain in a certain Spanish
trade which was ordinarily reserved to Spanish vessels ex-
clusively. The Dutch seized the vessels on the ground that
the Venetians had by this act lost their neutral character.29
The documents are scanty here, so too much should not be
concluded herefrom. But the incident foreshadows the cele-
brated "Rule of the War of I756."3o
(a) Rule of the War of Z756.
Keeping in mind the fact that we are dealing with the
right of a belligerent to interfere with, neutrals carrying aid
to his enemy, in so far as that can be done without infringe-
2" It is unfortunate for the sake of clearness that Great Britain did employ
the word "blockade" in her official papers, because though justified on grounds
of brevity of expression, it distracted attention from the true legal character of
the case. See "Statement of Measures Adopted to Intercept the Sea-borne
Commerce of Germany," Jan. 1916. Int. Con. Pam. No. iox, p. i ff.
9 Calendar of State Papers, Venetian (t603-07) No. 184.
30 For similar case in reign of Charles I (1630) see R. G. Marsden: "British
Prize Law," 25 Eng. Historical Review, 244 (1910).
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ment of sovereign neutral rights, our attention is turned to
that Seven Years War in Europe in which Frederick the
Great was attempting to defend his ill-gotten gains in Silesia
against Maria Theresa of Austria. In that struggle, the
naval phase was, as usual, fought out between France and
England, Equally, as usual, England mastered the sea and
cut off France from her colonial commerce by destroying
the French carrying trade with the West Indian Islands.
The Eighteenth Century was the era of the monopolistic
colonial policy whereby none could trade with the colony
save the mother country. Hence, since the French merchant
marine was swept from the seas, there were no vessels to
bring to the Parisian those essential constituents of his petit
dejeuner, coffee, chocolate and sugar.3 1 Moreover the French-
man was deprived of his after-dinner smoke, and to remedy
the situation France hit upon that method which Spain
had used a century and a half earlier, and licensed Dutch
ships to enter the colonial trade, in lieu of the lost French
ships.32 Great Britain could not tolerate such an evasion
of her belligerent rights by the interposition of a colorably
innocent neutral agent who took advantage of his neutrality
to aid France and negative the hard-won victory of British
sea power. What Great Britain did is expressed by Lord
Mansfield, "The rule is that if a neutral ship trades to a
French colony, withi all the privileges of a French ship,
and is thus adopted and naturalized, it must be looked upon
as a French ship and is liable to be taken."' 3 Or as stated in
Lord Loughborough's dictum, " . . the Dutch being
excluded from the French Islands in the West Indies in
time of peace, and only admitted in time of war to cover their
trade, their ships ought to be considered as adopted French
and therefore lawful prize."34 Such was the "Rule of the
31 See "A Short State of the Progress of French Trade and Navigation"
by M. Postlethwait, London, 1756, warning Englishmen of the variety of the
produce of the French West Indies, and what that produce was.
32 See "A Letter to the Dutch Merchants in England" (probably by Jas.
Marriott) London, 1759, protesting against this practice.
3 Berens v. Rucker, i W. Blackstone 314, K. B. (1761).
- Brymer v. Atkins, I H. Blackstone x65, C. P. (1789).
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War of 1756," that a vessel might not engage in time of
war in a trade from which it was excluded in time of peace.
(b) The Device of tfle "Broken Voyage."
With the Wars of the French Revolution the rule of
1756 began its career of development and controversy. For
between 1756 and 1789 there appeared in the family of
nations that newcomer who was destined to be the great
exponent of the rights of neutrals. In the war of the closing
years of the eighteenth century, French commerce was again
swept from the seas, and again France had to fall back on
the neutral carrying trade to get her colonial produce. But
a new-economic factor had entered. She had granted to the
United States in time of peace the right to trade from the
French West Indies to the United States, but not as yet, of
course, to take produce from the French Vest Indies to
France. From this developed the device of carrying goods
from the West Indies to an United States port, and then
transshipping them as American goods to France, thus
breaking the voyage to give the goods a neutral color. At
this point occurred the famous case of the "Polly" in which
Sir William Scott gave countenance to the evasive practice.36
Whatever its character in law or in history, there is no doubt
that from the economic point of view, this decision was
misleading. For this vessel was carrying West Indian prod-
ucts to the Mother country by way of Marblehead, Massa-
chusetts, where the goods were landed, duties paid thereon,
and the same goods reloaded and shipped to Europe. The
practice was in terms approved by Scott, despite the fact
that the King's Advocate requested him to rule "that it
would be the most nugatory thing in the world to say that
a trade which is not allowed to be carried on direct should
become legalized or allowed by mere transshipment in Amer-
ica." 36 But the Court did not so rule and United States
merchants jumped into this trade with enthusiasm.
3: The "-Polly," 2 C. Rob. 361 (i8oo).
3 Ibid.. 364.
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Avoiding the ancient controversy as to whether Scott
subsequently reversed his own decision, after he had allowed
numerous business enterprises to be initiated on the assump-
tion that the rule in the case of the "Polly" was law, we
notice that in the case of the "William" the law forbade the
device of the broken voyage.37
(c) The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage.
The "Polly" was a case in a court of first instance,
decided by Sir William Scott. The "William" was a decision
of the Appellate Court, six years later, by Sir William Grant.
As between the two, there cannot be much doubt which is
law. The case of the "Essex"3S in which Scott had in x8o5
applied the rule of 1756 to "broken voyages" had preceded
the case of the "William" by one year, and the weight of
the two enables us to say that the "Polly" is without par-
ticular significance for the purposes of this inquiry. But
notice must be made of it for nearly a hundred years later
Henry Adams was still pouring the broadsides of American
indignation at Great Britain. "On July 23, 18o5," says the
American historian, "Scott pronounced judgment in the case
of the 'Essex.' Setting aside his ruling in the case of the
'Polly,' he held that a neutral cargo which came from Mar-
tinique to Charleston and thence abroad 'was-ood prize.'
. . . Pitt's . . . moral sense had been blunted by
the desperation of the political struggle, but the same excuse
does not apply to Sir William Scott, . . no0good his-
torian was ever a good lawyer: whether any good lawyer
could be a good historian might equally be doubted. In law,
Sir William Scott was considered one of the greatest judges
that ever sat on the English bench, . . in history he
made himself and his court a secret instrument for carrying
out an act of piracy."3,
The law% as laid down in the case of the "William"
takes cognizance of the economic development which made
37 The "Williarn," 5 C. Rob. 385 (x8o6).
v Not reported; quoted in report of the "William" supra.
" Henry Adams- "History of the United States, etc.' 111, 45.
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possible an evasion of the spirit of the law, while nominally
obeying its letter, and got to the bottom of the matter in
these words, "The truth may not always be discernible, but
when it is discovered, it is according to the truth, and not
according to the fiction, that we are to give the transaction
its character and its denomination." Grant ruled exactly
as the King's Advocate in the case of the "Polly" had asked
Scott to rule. In his review of the cases Grant came to the
conclusion that the interposition of a neutral port and the
performance of the paper-work of mixing the goods with
the goods of the neutral were not bona-fide transactions,
but considered the voyage from the colony to the Mother
Country in Europe a "continuous voyage" which the rule
of 1756 had been designed to prevent. So by the end of
the Napoleonic period the law seems to have stood thus:
that inasmuch as a neutral could not be permitted to do
indirectly what he was forbidden to do directly, the inter-
position of a neutral agent or port could not break the con-,
tinuity of a voyage from a colony to its Mother country,
and the rights of neutrals in the matter were limited to their
peace-time rights. Such limitation would be enforced by
the belligerent."0
The next great group of cases are the American civil
war cases,41 wherein the doctrine is applied not to enemy
colonial trade via neutrals, but to enemy contraband and
blockade running trade via neutrals. Just as a new economic
factor, the United States, came into the situation between
1756 and 1789, so between 1815 and 1861 there entered a
new economic fact. The southern states developed agri-
culturally without developing industrially, so that when the
civil war in America broke out, the Southern Confederacy
40 An American investigator has come to the conclusion that the doctrine
of continuous voyage was applied by English courts as early as 1761 with regard
to contraband, and as early as 1762 with regard to enemy trade. L. H. Woolsey:
4 Amer. Jour. Internat. Law, 823, 847-
41 The growth of the doctrine from enemy trade to contraband was recog.
nized by the French court in the Crimean war, in seizing a cargo of saltpeter
bound in a neutral Dutch ship, from neutral Lisbon to neutral Hamburg, but
designed for transshipment to Riga (belligerent port). See Revue de Droit
Internationale, XXI, 55.
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had to look to England for many goods which could no longer
be drawn from the northern states. A short distance off
the coast of Florida lay the British colonial port of Nassau,
in the Bahamas, and in this sleepy West Indian town sud-
denly developed a thriving trade which the colony alone
would never have warranted. Northerncruisers stopped and
captured the British vessels en route from Liverpool to
Nassau and made prize of them. Protests went up that
this was an interference with neutral trade from one neutral
port to another neutral port. But the United States courts
upheld the rule that inasmuch as trade direct from Liverpool
to the Confederacy was forbidden by the blockade, the Brit-
ish merchants could not under the general principle of the
doctrine of continuous voyage interpose a colorably inno-
cent neutral port in order the more conveniently to run the
blockade.
* Unfortunately all the American Civil War cases involve
also the laws of contraband and blockade and we cannot
get a pure doctrine of continuous voyage case. But this
fact is illuminating to the extent that there is visible the
beginning of the merging of the three doctrines of contra-
band, blockade and continuous voyage into a general law
of the restraint of neutral commerce. Since the entire coast
of the Confederacy was under blockade, any vessel trying
to reach it via Nassau was ipso facto also trying to break
the blockade. The "Bermuda" was a neutral vessel bound
from neutral Liverpool to neutral Nassau with a cargo in-
tended for the Southern Confederacy, after touching at
Nassau. The court affirmed the condemnation in these
words, "the interposition of a neutral port between a heutral
departure and a belligerent destination has always been a
favorite resort of blockade runners and contraband carriers,
but it never avails them when the ultimate destination is
ascertained. A transportation from one point to another
remains continuous, so long as the intent remains unchanged,
no matter what stoppage or transshipment intervenes."12
"2 The "Bermuda." 3 Wallace 514 (1865).
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This expression "ultimate destination" now becomes the
significant factor in the law.
(d) Doctrine of Ultimate Desiination.
Two cases illustrate the grovth of the law during the
American Civil War, one as regards blockade alone, and
one as regards contraband alone. The case which illustrates
the application of the law to breach of blockade without
involving contraband is that of the "Circassian."'43 This
was a vessel with a cargo of non-contraband goods bound
from Bordeaux to Havana, thence intending to run the block-
ade to New Orleans. That such a device to.evade belligerent
rights- could not be tolerated was announced by the court
affirming the capture. After discussing the cargo "no part
of which was contraband" Chief Justice Chase said, "The
vessel was chartered and her cargo shipped with the purpose
of forcing the blockade. The destination at Havana was
merely colorable."
The case which involves application of the law to con-
traband without involving blockade is that of the "Peter-
hoff."" The question of blockade was ruled out in so many
words, because a blockade was a purely maritime affair,
and this was a vessel with part contraband cargo bound from
neutral England to neutral Mexico. Yet the contraband
part of the cargo was condemned under the law, as their
ultimate destination was shipment over land to Texas, even
if the Federal blockade could not apply to the neutral Mex-
ican port. "The trade of neutrals with belligerents in
articles not contraband is absolutely free unless interrupted
by blockade; the conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of
contraband articles is always unlawful and such articles
may always be seized during transit by sea."
One of the very clearest expositions of the law by an
American jurist was made in a lower court decision in which
41 The "C ircassian," 2 Vallace 135.
"The "Peterhoff," s Wallace 28 (1866). The Mexican neutral destina-
tion was the port of Matamoras, just across the Rio Grande from belligerent
Brownsville, Texas.
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was quoted an Ordinance of the Continental Congress in
relation to restraining neutral trade by declaring it lawful
to capture all "contraband goods, wares, merchandises, to
whatever nation belonging, although found in a neutral
bottom, if destined for the use of the enemy." s If the word
"use" as here employed is understood in its technical economic
sense, as the satisfaction of some want, the meaning of the
word will be illuminated, not restricted. It is the prevention
of goods with economic value for the prosecution of war
from reaching an enemy that is the basis of the problem. Fur-
ther on, the same judge says, "The commerce is in the desti-
nation and intended use of the property laden on board of
the vessel, and not the incidental and ancillary and temporary
voyage of the vessel, which may be but one of the many
carriers through which the property is to reach its true and
original destination." This point of ultimate destination
should never be lost sight of in observing the development
of the law.
The formation of a general rule of the law as it stood at
the end of the American Civil War has frequently been
atterhipted. One writer whose comprehensive and exhaustive
analysis of all of the British, American and Continental
European cases is worthy of careful study, has come to the
conclusion that the essence of the rule is "a person cannot be
permitted to do by indirection what he is forbidden to do
directly, and that a fraudulent act is none the less fraudulent
and objectionable because it is concealed beneath the form
of legality."4" Certainly that factor is traceable throughout
the cases in which neutrals have sought to give their for-
bidden trade an immunity bath by the interposition of a
neutral agent. But the difficulty with the rule as above
stated is the question, "How are belligerents to know when
a neutral is trying to do by indirection what he is forbidden
to do directly?" This element is partially supplied by another
4" The "Stephen Hart," Blatchford's Pri7e Cases 387, Dist. Ct. So. N. Y.
(x863),
4C C. B. Elliott: "The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage," i Amer. Jour.
International Law, 6o.
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writer who, after an examination of the early English prac-
tice, contends that" the-controlling element running through
the early cases of direct breach of the enemy trade, contra-
band or blockade, appears to be that of the intention, and
that the same element runs through the early cases of indi-
rect breach of the rules of enemy trade, that is, cases in
which the doctrine of continuous voyage has been applied or
discussed."' 7 A case in point is the "Springbok," -in which
Chase declared, "We do not how refer to the cargo for the
purpose of determining whether it is liable to condemnation
as contraband, but for the purpose of ascertaining its real
destination; for, contraband or not, it could not be con-
demni~d if really destined for Nassau and not beyond, and
contraband or not it must be condemned if destined for any
rebel port, for all rebel ports were under blockade."
' "6 In
other words, whether a neutral is trying to aid the enemy
indirectly when forbidden to do so directly will be deter-
mined by the intent, and the intent may in part be deter-
mined by the character of the cargo. So far, so good, but
was this international law in the sense of its being generally
accepted?
To answer this concisely we may say that, on the whole,
it was and is law. It is true, the doctrine had to fight hard
for recognition on the continent of Europe, but France had
followed it in the Crimean War and Italy in her Abyssinian
war," and by the close of the nineteenth century recognition
was fairly general. Bluntschli epitomized the law in his
"Si les navires ou marchandises ne ont expedi6s A destina-
tion d'un port neutre que pour mieux venir en aide a 'en-
nemi, il y aura contrebande de guerre et la confiscation sera
justifie.", 0 The acceptance was so general that when the
London Naval Conference met in 19o9 it attempted to
47L. H. Woolsey: "Some EarI5 Cases on Continuous Voyage," 4 Amer.
jour. of Internat. Law, 823, 846.
48 The "Springbok," 5 Wallace, x (1866). N. B., this also distinguishes
the law as applied to contraband alone and as applied to blockade alone.
"The "Doelwijk," J. B. Moore, Dig. VII, 744. Dutch vessel carrying
arms to neutral African port for shipment overland to belligerent.
60 Bluntschli: Droit Internationale Codifi6, par. 813.
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reduce the whole thing to writing. While not, per se, law,
yet that document, except on a few points, states rules em-
bodying long standing practices and, as such, was binding
on belligerents whether they had accepted the declaration
or not. In the light of our discussion so far, what is sig-
nificant about the declaration is in the rules there formulated
for ascertaining the intent of the neutral. "Absolute con-
traband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to
the territory belonging to, or occupied by, the enemy, 'or
to the armed forcet of the enemy. It is immaterial whether
the carriage of the goods is direct or entails either trans-
shipment or transport overland."sl But as to conditional
contraband, unless the goods were consigned "to the enemy
authorities, or merchants established in the enemy country,
when it is well known. that such merchant supplies articles
of this kind to the enemy," or to an enemy base of supplies,
the goods are presumed to have an innocent destination.
Nevertheless, "the presumptions laid down in this article
admit of proof to the contrary."' 2 Let us fasten our atten-
tion on that word "presumption," for around it the con-
troversy now rages. The Declaration of London seems in
the main to put the burden of proof on the captor. The
chief crime alleged against Great Britain in the late war is
that she switched that burden to the neutral. This aroused
one American (then-ineutral) writer to protest "the effect
of this order was to extend the application of the rule of
continuous voyage to the carriage of conditional contraband
and to reverse the established rule, which places upon the
captor, and not upon the owner, the burden of proving the
hostile destination."s3 Another American critic expressed
the opinion, "W1hat directly concerns us is that our trade
with the Central Empires is cut off, and our trade with the
neutral neighbors of these empires is limited by measures
of at least doubtful legality. If they constitute an exten-
$1 Declaration of London Art. 3o.
22Declaration of London, Art. 34.
0 J. W. Garner: "Contraband, Right of Search and Continuous Voyage"
in Amer. Jour. Inter. Law, IX, 372, 383.
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sion of the law of blockade, they seem to us to stretch this
law to the breaking point.""
But there are other elements besides the legal and the
economic which enter into the situation. In 1861 August
Belmont, the New York agent of the Rothschilds, sought in
a lengthy interview to lay before Lord Palmerston the right-
eousness and justice of the Northern cause in the American
Civil War. All he could elicit from Palmerston was, "We
don't like slavery, but we want cotton and we dislike your
Morrill tariff.""5 The sting of those words "we want cot-
ton" in response to a recital of the cause of liberty needs no
comment. In reviewing the attacks on Great Britain during
the days of American neutrality in the world war the state-
ment "what directly concerns us is that our trade with the
Central Empires is cut off" stands today in a different light
from what it did when it was uttered. But more than that,
if we examine the terms of the celebrated Order in Council
which is alleged to have switched the burden of proof, it
will at least raise a doubt as to whether Great Britain really
did "extend" international law.
The Order in Council ruled "that conditional contra-
baad shall be liable to capture on board a vessel bound for
a neutral port, if the goods are consigned 'to order,' or if
the ship's papers do not show who is the consignee, or if
they show a consignee" in enemy territory. "In the cases
covered by the preceding paragraph . . it shall lie
upon the owner of the goods to prove that their destination
is innocent." 6 This was the source of the trouble. But
is it a "stretching" or "extension" of the law to shift the
burden of proof in a case where the neutral merchant de-
liberately arouses suspicion by consigning his shipment to
an anonymous consignee? The United States did that very
thing fifty years earlier, when Chase declared "that some
other destination than Nassau was intended may be in-
"Monroe Smith: "American Diplomacy in the European War," Political
Science Quarterly, XXXI, 491.
65 J. W. Foster: Century of American Diplomacy, 373.
6Order in Council of Oct. 29, 1915, Internat. Concil. Pamphlets, No. 95,
p. 0.
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ferred from the fact that the consignment shown by the
bills of lading and manifest was 'to order or assigns." ' $?
Moreover the British Foreign Office adduced evidence to
demonstrate that the trade of small neutrals contiguous to
Germany in articles badly needed by Germany was increased
so tremendously during the early months of the war that he
would be very obtuse indeed who would blind himself to
such facts. The case of Denmark was particularly instruc-.
tive. Normally an exporter of meat and meat products,
she suddenly became a tremendous importer. It could not
be alleged that this was because her trade with Germany
was curtailed by German needs during the war, because
Denmark exported meat to Germany and did not import
meat therefrom.12 It was perfectly obvious that these tre-
mendous shipments of meat and meat products (fats, of
course) were simply going to Germany by the same old ruse
which Holland had refused to tolerate in i6o4, which Eng-
land had refused to tolerate in the Napoleonic wars, which
France had refused to tolerate in the Crimean War, which
the United States had refused to tolerate in the Civil War,
which Italy had refused to tolerate in her Abyssinian War
and which if a belligerent had endured it, he would have
been permitting his "eyes to be filled with the dust of theories
and technicalities and blinded to the realities of the case."
But let us admit 'the extreme contention, that Great
Britain did "shift the burden of proof in an unprecedented
manner." What is the nature of a burden of proof and the
rule of presumption? "Presumptions are aids to reasoning
and argumentation, which assume the truth of certain mat-
ters, for the general purpose of some given inquiry
presumptions, assumption, taking for granted, are simply
so many names for an act or process which aids or shortens
the inquiry or argument.""5 Since the law of restraint of
neutral commerce is no question of criminal law "the test
"1 The "Springbok," op. Cit. 25.
"3 Sir E. Grey to American Ambassador, Feb. 10, 1915, Int. Con. Pam-
phlets. No. 95, P. 34.
6 J. B. Thayer: "Treatise on Evidence at Common Law," 314 ft., 357 if-
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as to the burden of proof is simply to consider which party
would be successful if no evidence .at all were given, or if
no more evidence were given at this particular point in the
case, because it is obvious that during the contro--ersy in
litigation, there are points at which the onus of prcof shifts,
and at which the trilbunal must say, if the case stopped there
it must he decided in a particular way. Such being the
case it is not a burden which rests forever on the person on
whom it is first cast, but as soon as he in turn finds evidence
which prima facie rebuts the evidence against which he is
contending, the burden shifts until there is evidence which
satisfies the demand."60 That is why, when the doctrine
of continuous voyage came before the British Court in the
world war, the court replied to the neutral, "It is not a crime
to dispatch contraband to belligerents . . but the argu-.
ment proceeded as if it were as essential for the captors to
prove intention as strictly as in a criminal trial."
As has been observed, the crux of the matter is not on
methods of proving intention, a question of procedure and
not of substantive law at all! The real point of which the
critics have completely lost sight is that if the neutrals would
assume the burden in these cases of anonymous consignee,
business would be finished much more quickly. One cannot
read the diplomatic correspondence between Great Britain
and the United States in the early days of the World War
without being impressed with the fact that what annoyed
Americans as much as anything else was the delay to which their
business rights were being subjected. Yet when Great Britain
employed a well-known legal device to "shorten the inquiry,"
complaints were made that she was "extending" interna-
tional law.
The expression "the burden of proof shifts" throws
some light on the question as to whether the British modi-
60The "Kim" 113 Law Times Reports, 1002 (1915): "As to the modi-
fications regarding presumption and the burden of proof . . . these are
matters reallv affecting the rules of evidence and methods of proof in this court,
* * * I fail to see how it is possible to contend that they are violations of any
rule of International Law."
"1 Ibid.
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fications are "growths" or "extensions." The purpose of
the distinction is primarily to direct the attention to the
development of the law in response to the conditions of
civilization and the development in response to the wishes
of persons. The law "grows" because of its own dynamic
qualities, because being a living thing, it must adjust itself
to new environmental influences or else die of inanition and
neglect. The law is "extended" by some agent outside itself,
and such extension is certainly questionable. "Growth" is
the response of the law to the economic and social influences
and the enlightened moral sense of the community. "Ex-
tension" is merely a forcible and conscious change by an i,,
individual party, and may or may not be in accord with
the demands of the times, and hence may or may not be
of ultimate or permanent significance. By using the ex-
pression, "the burden of proof shifts," the writer on evidence
does not say "so-and-so shifts the burden of proof." There
is all the difference in the world; and that we are living in
an age of the shifting of the burden of proof is another illus-
tration of the fact that what Britain did was in the nature 2-
of "growth" rather than of "extension." The bill for the
enforcement of the prohibition amendment-to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, as originally passed by the House
of Representatives, is an interesting and highly significant
example of the fact that in a world where increased govern-
mental control is the order of the day, the burden of pr9of 1- .3
is shifting all along the line. The clause of that bill, "The
possessor of such liquors, however, bears the burden of
proof that the liquor was acquired and is possessed lawfully"
is certainly a serious blow at the old doctrine that a man is
presumed innocent until proved guilty. Yet it is but one 31 7
phase of the whole trend of modem history. Civilians who
became officers in -the United States Army during the World
War were constantly irritated at the presumption everywhere
existing in the system that they were dishonest and putting
upon them the burden of proving that they were not.
Whether this shifted burden of proof is ultimately to
be accepted as international law is, of course, yet in the realm 3 F7
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of theory. But it is significant to note the opinion thereon
of the Institute of International Law (an association of the
publicists of all nations). In a meeting in 1882 that associa-
tion condemned the whole doctrine of continuous voyage.
In 1896, they not only reversed themselves and approved
the doctrine, but approved it in these words, "A destination
for the enemy is presumed when the carriage of goods is
directed toward one of his ports, or toward a neutral port,
which, by evident proofs arising from incontestable facts,
is only a stage in the carriage to the enemy, as the final object
of the same commercial transaction." 62 A glance at the
map will reveal the fact that two railways make Copenhagen
but a stage in the journey from New York- to Berlin, while
a perfect net-work of lines makes Rotterdam but a stage in
the journey from Buenos Ayres to Cologne. During the
world war one investigator gave an interesting demonstra-
tion of the fact that "Germany has been making a maximum
use of her small (neutral) neighbors, in a highly profitable
mutual arrangement to counter what would otherwise be
the disastrous effects of the ioss of control of the seas."'
The economic facts of the case are surely "incontestable."
It was before the day of steam, electricity, wireless
telegraphy and aeronautics that Adam Smith remarked of
the Art of War, "The state of the mechanical arts with which
war is necessarily connected, determines the degree of per-
fection to which it is capable of being carried at any par-
ticular time."6' If true in 1776, how much more true today?
In the late world war every worker at the "mechanical
arts" was part of the war machine, and why then is there
not full justice in the statement, "In the peculiar circum-
stances of the present struggle, where the forces of the enemy
comprise so large a proportion of the population, and .where
there is so little evidence of shipments on private as dis-
tinguished from Government account, it is most reasonable
w- Annuaire d' Institut de Droit Internationale, XIV (1895-6): 192-3.
3 Jas. L. Moore in "Readings in the Economics of War" (Chicago Univ.),
285.
"Wealth of Nations. Bk. V, Ch. 1.
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that the burden of proof should rest upon the claimant"
that his shipment had a neutral destination."s It is in a
sense, economics and political and social philosophy which
have demanded the change in the law, rather than the wishes
of any particular state or nation. Lord Stowell's remark,
"All law is resolved into general principles; the cases which
may arise under new combinations of circumstances, leading
to an extended application of principles, ancient and recog-
nized, by just corollaries, may be infinite,""6 goes to the
bottom of the matter. But it seems that his use of the
expression "extended application" would be better under-
stood as "growth" of the law.
CoNcLUsIoN: THE GROWTH OF THE LAW.
It is not pretended that the conclusions reached here
are law; for international law gains its legal -nature as well
as its legal force by the acquiescence of nations and not
through the presentations of writers. But it is fair to ask
whether this is not the direction which the trend of legal
and historical development is taking. The growth seems to
be in the direction of increasing the rights of belligerents and
diminishing the rights of neutrals to carry on their commerce
undisturbed by war. If this is the case, such growth is
certainly contrary to the traditional position of the United
States in its foreign relatins. If the conclusions here reached
be correct, it is important that their ultimate significance
be understood. In the past, the belligerent has been his
own sanction in the international law which affected his
rights. But the neutral has always been reduced to protests
and to collecting damages later on. But this does not always
do justice under the law. The twentieth century saw the
final payment of claims of United States merchants which
were incurred by the actions of France in the eighteenth
century. The so-called French Spoliation Claims give pause
to him who would let belligerent aggression continue un-
ss Sir Edward Grey.
" The "Atalanta," 6 C. Rob. 440, 458 (18o8).
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checked and then try to satisfy the claims with the collec-
tion of damages when the war is over. 7 In that interesting
set of cases the combined delays of the French in making
payment, of the Court of Claims in making awards, of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in making recom-
mendations, of the House Ways and Means Committee in
making appropriations led to the report in 1913 in which
numerous claims were dismissed for non-prosecution. No
wonder; many of the people interested had long since been
dead.68
In connection with the future application of the law of
continuous voyages, it is well to note the character of some
of the new national states which the war has summoned into
existence. Four, at least, have warlike historical traditions
and propensities which do not augur well for the future peace
of the world. In case war breaks out, we have to notice
that two of them, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, have no
sea-coast, while two others, P6land and Jugo-Slavia, can
be blockaded by cutting off the single entrance .at the mouth
of the Vistula or the Straits of Otranto. These are the very
conditions which provoke the controversies on the law of
continuous voyages. Such controversies can only be avoided
by some satisfactory statement of the law such as a Hague
Conference, or some department of the League of Nations
is qualified to make. This the London Naval Conference
attempted to do, but its recommendations were not binding
upon the belligerents. This introduces one of the most
important elements of all, namely, how, after the law has
been reduced to writing, is that law to be enforced by
neutrals as against belligerents? That, of course, is the
problem of political science under the League of Nations.
This article has been limited to a discussion of the law with
which any League of Nations must deal, because the for-
mation of rules and laws has throughout the history of law
preceded institutions which thoroughly enforce those rules.
See G. A. King, S. Doc. 451, 64th Cong. (1916) reprinted from Amer.
Jour. of International Law.
" H. DoC. 379,63rd Cong.
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The fact that international law has no sanction discourages
no one; the fact that it has been flagrantly violated discour-
ages no one. The fact that international law is, is the fact
which concerns us, and we can treat of that law with the
confident assurance that sonic day methods of enforcement
will follow as surely as they did follow gradually on the
development of civil and municipal law.6,
Randolph Greenfield Adams.
'*On this point generally see R. G. Gray: "International Tribunals in
the Light of the History of Law," 32 Harvard Law Review, 825.
